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T he controversy about national versus global monetarism is being fuelled primarily by the growing interdependence of national economies, which inevitably entails an increase in international financial transactions and hence an internationalisation of the financial markets and the banking sector. 3 Many observers conclude from this that there must be a very close link between the world money supply and world inflation.
This view would be immediately comprehensible if there were a system of immutably fixed exchange rates, because then it would be neither practicable nor logical to control a money supply aggregate defined in strictly national terms, not only because of the obligation to intervene in the foreign exchange markets, which represents an important and involuntary source of money creation, 4 but also because of the exchange rate and conversion guarantees provided by the central banks, which ties the currencies concerned so closely together that they can be regarded as almost perfect substitutes. However, it is pointless today to talk of immutably fixed exchange rates; on the contrary, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 and its replacement by a system of more or less flexible exchange rates gave rise to the expectation that monetary policy would henceforth be free from external influences.
That view does not sound implausible. In a system Of flexible exchange rates, sales and purchases of foreign exchange by the central banks are no longer necessary, so that the money supply is determinedentirely by domestic factors. This freedom from external * HWWA-Institut fQr Wirtschaftsforschung-Hamburg.
INTERECONOMICS, May/June 1985 constraints diminishes only i if the central 'banks intervene in spite of flexible eXchange rates, in other words if there is "managed" or "dirty" floating. 5
However, the critics of national management of the money supply are not basically concerned whether floating is "clean" or "dirty"; they consider the autonomy of the central bank in an open economy to be endangered even if exchange rates are completely flexible. They blame this on three factors: rq international currency substitution; [] the existence of the Euro-currency markets; [] the financial investments and reserves of multinational enterprises and Certain central banks (multiple reserve currency system).
The World Money Supply Hypothesis
The first assumption that there is a close substitution relationship between the media of exchange of the major industrialised countries, in other words the currency substitution hypothesis, is a cornerstone in McKinnon's world money supply theory. His concept is oriented towards a "weighted world average money growth", in which the weights are based on countries' gross national product for 1970 (see Table 1 ). 6 The central idea in McKinnon's theory can be illustrated in the following equation:
If control of the world money supply is confined to the currencies of the USA, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany, as McKinnon suggests, then d% expresses the growth rate, M1W represents the world money supply, M1 US, M1G and M1J the M1 aggregates (cash in circulation and sight deposits) in the USA, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan and .45 the (fictitious) relative weight of the USA, measured in terms of the relative size of the US gross national product. According to McKinnon, the rate of growth in the world money supply is therefore the sum of the growth rates of the money supply in selected countries, weighted according to their GNP.
Reference to a world money supply makes sense only if the world aggregate as well as national money supplies actually finances economic activity in individual nations. However, with regard to his collection of money supply aggregates McKinnon acknowledges that "which of these convertible currencies are the strongest substitutes for one another, and which should enter with the heaviest weights in any index of world money, is not adressed ... no econometric attempt is made to distinguish the international moneyness of, say, the Italian lira from that of the German mark". 7 It is therefore necessary to test the validity of the suspicion expressed by McKinnon and many others that international currency substitution (CS) is now occurring. 8
Currency Substitution
The observation that many companies and households hold their cash balances not only in domestic currency but also in foreign currencies is often advanced as an indication of the existence of currency substitution. The adherents to the CS hypothesis therefore also regard money as an internationally mobile factor. For example, Niehans surmises that if the liquid funds of firms, banks and households are diversified among several currencies, then the liquidity of a single economy, such as that of Switzerland, depends not only on the supply of its own currency but also the world supply of other means of payment such as dollars, marks and pounds sterling. 9
If the CS school is right, there is a danger that domestic currency will be used abroad and foreign currencyat home. If that is the case, domestic money will be withdrawn from the domestic economy and can therefore no longer have any behavioural significance there, while domestic economic activity will be partly financed by foreign money. Furthermore, a change in the monetary policy of a particular country will induce an adjustment in the currency structure of international cash balances, which will at least partly offset the change in policy. Hence, in extreme casest, an expansionary monetary policy in a particular country merely inflates the world money supply without generating any specific monetary stimulus in the country concerned. It is particularly notew~ffhy tl"i&~McKinn6nand many others see CS as a phenomenon of flexible exchange rates. They argue that since exchange risks are now high, economic agents who wish to avoid risks no longer concentrate their cash balances in a single currency but spread them over several. 1~ As a corollary, the money supply has been internationalised not despite, but because of, the flexibility of exchange rates.
These hypotheses appear fairly plausible at first sight, but upon closer inspection they can be seen to have serious deficiencies. The crux of the matter is the assumed currency indifference. In contrast to the world described by the CS school, firms and individuals do in reality have marked currency preferences, because the high exchange rate risk has precisely the opposite effect to that described by the CS school. Considerable information and transaction costs arise if liquid balances are not held in the currency in which payments are due. Hence, economic entities that shun risks and are under no cost illusion prefer to hold their cash balances in precisely the currency in which they have payment commitments; as a rule, they therefore have a marked preference for domestic currency. 11
On the other hand, holding balances in foreign currency is efficient if payments must be made in these currencies. In many cases,-the international composition of cash balances can be explained simply by the fact that payment commitments are incurred simultaneously in several currencies. This is true in the case of multinational enterprises, for example. By definition, the multis produce in several countries, so that they incur liabilities such as wages, the cost of inputs, taxes, etc., which can be met only in the relevant national currency. If such an enterprise concentrated its cash balances in a single currency it would have to bear substantial costs whenever currency was converted to make payments. Precisely because national currencies are not substitutes for one another, it makes sense for the structure of cash balances to be diversified internationally to match transactions in the various production locations. exchange and its function as a store of value. In fact, a multitude of media can serve as a store of value, such as bonds,shares, gold, etc., but money is the only one that can be used directly for payment purposes. As a medium of exchange, it serves to reduce information and transaction costs that would arise in a pure exchange economy. ~2 For that reason, only those media that are associated with particularly low information and transaction costs are acceptable as money. Foreign currencies fail to meet this criterion when it comes to financing domestic transactions. Unlike domestic currency, they give rise to additional costs and from the point of view of risk are no different from other assets whose value in domestic currency is also uncertain, such as shares, gold, etc. There is therefore no currency substitution that could render national monetary policy ineffectual. ~3
Nor does the fact that the US dollar is normally used as the means of payment (and accounting unit) for international transactions in oil and other raw materials jeopardise monetary control in other countries. TM As the raw materials are always ultimately sold for domestic payments media, the dollar merely finances trade between nations, but not domestic economic activity in countries other than the USA (and possibly Israel, whose domestic currency, the shekel, is being increasingly displaced by the dollar owing' to rampant inflation). Other currencies are not even used as international payments media. 15
The lessons are of particular interest if one examines the monetary significance of the Euro-currency markets, which are sometimes counted as part of the world money supply.
The Euro-currency Markets
The Euro-currency markets should not be visualised as a closed system. Instead, there are various submarkets, such as the Euro-dollar market, the Euro-DM market, the Euro-franc market, which must be differentiated strictly for purposes of analysis. ~6 The demarcation lines between the various currencies are mainly a consequence of the exchange risk, which induces the banks to grant 'loans exclusively in the currency in which they are refinanced.
The assessment of the monetary significance of the Euro-currency market depends primarily on whether Euro-currency deposits are actually money, as is often assumed. Doubts arise in this respect if one bears in mind that Euro-currency balances cannot be used directly for domestic payments but must first be converted into payments media, in other words into dollar balances at banks in the USA or DM sight balances with banks in Germany. 17 Hence, there would be absolutely no justification for including Euro-currency deposits in the M1 money supply.
Another question, however, is whether Euro-currency deposits should be regarded as quasi-money, which is normally included in M2 alongside M1 and comprises deposits that cannot be used directly for payments purposes but can be converted into payments media at relatively little cost and usually serve as transactions balances. The answer hinges upon deposit holders' perception of the function of Euro-currency deposits, in other words the purpose for which they ultimately hold them. It must therefore be clarified whether Eurocurrency deposits serve predominantly as transaction balances or are regarded mainly as financial investments.
The very short periods of notice on many Eurocurrency deposits would seem to suggest that the transaction motive is predominant. However, the period of notice shows only the minimum term of the deposits, not the maximum term, since the deposit can be rolled over repeatedly. Factors militating against the transaction motive include the costs that arise if Eurocurrency deposits are transferred to the domestic banking market and the fact that as a rule notice cannot be given before the due date. 18 More important, however, is the attractive rate of interest that can be obtained on the Euro-currency market. As Euro- currency accounts offer a relatively high and safe return, there is much to be said for concluding that they ultimately serve as financial investments, more akin functionally to the capital market than to money.
However, if Euro-currency deposits are finally used to make payments, the account-holding bank must instruct a bank in the country concerned to make sight deposits available. The same applies if a Euro-bank grants a loan, as lending in the Euro-currency market is effected solely by transferring domestic means of exchange, in other words sight deposits at a domestic bank, to the borrower. 19 It should be borne in mind here that as a rule the Euro-bank is the subsidiary or branch of a domestic bank, and hence virtually a detached loans department. 2~ It is therefore economically, if not always legally, identical with the parent bank, so that sight balances held by the domestic parent bank are credited to the borrower. If other circumstances remain unchanged, the domestic money supply will therefore increase precisely as.though the domestic parent bank had itself granted ~ the loan. This does not mean, however, that the Euro-currency market has any special ability to create money; indeed, money creation via the Euro-market is subject to the same restrictions as money creation by any other means.
As a rule, every lending bank, including a banking group with Euro-market subsidiaries, must therefore accept a reduction in balances at the central bank, because ultimately the loan transits through domestic accounts, so that additional minimum reserves must be held in, say, Germany or the USA; there may also be outflows of cash or transfers to other banks which can only be effected via accounts at the central bank. It is true that, credit standing permitting, an individual bank can acquire central-bank money on the money market at any time, but the market only serves to redistribute the central-bank money that is already available; it is in no way able to place additional money in circulation. As the central bank has a monopoly over the supply of centralbank money, the commercial banks have to dance to the central bank's tune, whether the loans are granted by domestic banks or by Euro-banks.
Multiple Reserve Currency System
The central banks are nevertheless confronted with foreign trade problems in reaching their monetary policy decisions, owing to the competition among investments in financial assets, especially bonds and high interest bearing bank deposits denominated in US dollars, Swiss francs, D-marks or yen. 21 Experience has shown that abrupt changes in the preferences of internationally operating investors and central banks that spread their foreign exchange reserves over several currencies (especially the central banks of the OPEC countries) are reflected in sharp fluctuations in exchange rates and interest rates. This can cause changes in the domestic demand for money, which in turn may trigger expansionary or restrictive forces.
This danger was probably the reason why both the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank overshot their money supply targets over a long period in the seventies. 22 The crucial problem with such money supply control oriented towards foreign trade is that it is virtually impossible to separate external and domestic stimuli with any degree of precision, so that the central bank is in danger of wrongly dosing its expansion of the money supply, thereby fuelling inflation or causing deflation. 23
In fact, it would appear that both the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank rather overdid things. 24 tf the expansion in the money supply had been geared strictly to the growth in production potential, the acceleration in inflation at the end of the seventies would have been avoided and the restrictive policy of the early eighties would have been unnecessary. Viewed in these terms, McKinnon and his supporters are wrong. Given the lack of international currency substitution and the non-existence of a world money supply, the central banks should pay less rather than more heed to foreign trade. 
